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Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA,
Inc.: 35 U.S.C. § 102 Looks Like a New Duck
and Sounds like a New Duck, but the On-Sale
Bar is the Same Ole Goose
C HRISTOPHER HOWES * ©
In Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.,1 the Supreme Court of the
United States addressed whether the America Invents Act (“AIA”) changed the
meaning of the on-sale bar to allow an invention to be considered not on sale
when it is subject to a commercial sale to a third party that is required to keep the
invention confidential.2 The Court correctly held that the on-sale bar applied to
Helsinn Healthcare S.A.’s patent governed by the AIA because Congress did not
clearly express its intent to change the years of pre-AIA precedent,3 Helsinn and
MGI’s transaction was not secret and placed the invention on sale as defined by its
claims,4 and the holding furthers the promotion of the progress of science and
useful arts.5
I.

T HE CASE

Helsinn Healthcare S.A. (“Helsinn”) is the owner of the four patents-in-suit, U.S.
Patent Nos. 7,947,724 (“‘724 patent”), 7,947,725 (“‘725 patent”), 7,960,424 (“‘424
patent”), and 8,598,219 (“‘219 patent”) (collectively, “the patents-in-suit”), which
are directed to reducing the likelihood of chemotherapy-induced nausea and

©Christopher Howes 2020.
* The author is a J.D. Candidate, 2020, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. I would like to
thank the editors and staff on the Journal of Business and Technology Law, specifically Kevin Redden, Samuel
Schwartz, Samuel Kava, Cymone Gosnell, and Elizabeth McClellan for their insightful feedback and suggestions
throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank the many professors of the Intellectual Property
Law program at University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law for constructing an excellent
program, especially Professor Patricia Campbell. Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Chris and Debbie
Howes, and the rest of my family and friends for all their support.
1. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019).
2. Id. at 629.
3. See infra Section IV.A.
4. See infra Section IV.B.
5. See infra Section IV.C.
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vomiting (“CINV”).6 Helsinn brought suit under the Hatch-Waxman Act7 against
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd.
(collectively, “Teva”) alleging that Teva’s Abbreviated New Drug Application
(“ANDA”) infringed various patent claims.8 One of Teva’s defenses was that
Helsinn entered into a sale more than one year prior to the critical date patent, so
the asserted claims were invalid under the on-sale bar provision of 35 U.S.C. §
102.9
Between 2005 and 2006, before the effective date of the AIA, Helsinn filed
three patent applications that issued as the ‘724, ‘725, and ‘424 patents. 10 In May
2013, after the effective date of the AIA of March 16, 2013, Helsinn filed a fourth
patent application that issued as the ‘219 patent. 11 All of Helsinn’s patents-in-suit
claimed priority to a provisional patent filed on January 30, 2003; thus the critical
date for the on-sale bar would be one year prior, January 30, 2002. 12 Under the
on-sale bar, an invention that is subject to a sale before the critical date can be
invalidating prior art.13 On April 6, 2001, approximately nine months before the
critical date, Helsinn and MGI Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“MGI”) entered into a License
Agreement and a Supply and Purchase Agreement. 14 Under the License
Agreement, MGI agreed to pay $11 million plus additional future royalties on
distribution of 0.25 mg and 0.75 mg doses of palonosetron in the United States. 15
Under the Supply and Purchase Agreement, MGI agreed to purchase exclusively
from Helsinn, and Helsinn agreed to supply MGI the two dosages of palonosetron
that were approved by the FDA. 16 These agreements were announced in a joint
press release between the two corporations, as well as in a partially redacted copy
of the License Agreement, and a partially redacted copy of the Supply and
Purchase Agreement included in MGI’s Form 8-K filing with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”).17

6.

Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2012).
8. Helsinn, 855 F.3d at 1360.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1362.
11. Id. at 1362.
12. Id. at 1360.
13. Id.
14. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.; See MGI Pharma Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) Ex. 99.1 (Apr. 25, 2001) (“the redacted License
Agreement”); MGI Pharma Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) Ex. 99.2 (Apr. 25, 2001) (“the redacted Supply and
Purchase Agreement”).
7.
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In a bench trial, the district court held the claims of the patents-in-suit were
valid and were infringed by Teva’s 0.25 mg dose.18 To address the on-sale issue,
the court applied the two-step framework from Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.19, 20
When analyzing the pre-AIA patents, ‘724, ‘725, and ‘424, under pre-AIA § 102(b),
the district court found the Supply and Purchase Agreement was a “contract for
future sale of a commercial product embodying the 0.25 mg dose and therefore
constituted a sale under § 102(b),” satisfying the first prong of Pfaff v. Wells
Electronics (“Pfaff”).21 However, the district court found that the claimed invention
was not reduced to practice before the critical date, January 30, 2002, and thus
was not on sale because the invention was not ready for patenting at that time,
failing the second prong of Pfaff.22
With respect to the ‘219 patent, governed by the AIA, the district court held
“the AIA changed the meaning of the on-sale bar and § 102(a)(1) now ‘requires a
public sale or offer for sale of the claimed invention.’” 23 The district court
concluded that a sale must publicly disclose the details of the invention for the
sale to be “public” under the AIA, and found that although the Supply and
Purchase Agreement “disclosed the sale agreement and substance of the
transaction, it failed to publicly disclosed the 0.25 mg dose.” 24 Because the district
court did not find the Supply and Purchase Agreement to publicly disclose the 0.25
mg dose, the court held it did not constitute a public sale or commercial offer for
sale.25 Finally, the court concluded that the ‘219 patent also was not ready for
patenting before the critical date, and thus held “the asserted claims of the four
patents were not invalid.”26
Teva appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which had jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. § 1295(a). 27 The Federal Circuit reversed
the district court and found the asserted claims were invalid under the on-sale
bar.28 In finding the asserted claims invalid, the court found the claims of the preAIA patents were subject to the on-sale bar under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102,29 the

18.

Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167048, 167056 (D.N.J. 2015).
525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998). (“We conclude, therefore that the on-sale bar applies when two conditions
are satisfied before the critical date. First, the product must be the subject of a commercial offer for sale. . . .
Second, the invention must be ready for patenting.”)
20. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
21. Id. (citing Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998)).
22. Id.
23. Id. (quoting J.A. 113 (emphasis added)).
24. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
29. Id. at 1367.
19.
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claims of the ‘219 patent were subject to the on-sale bar under AIA 35 U.S.C. §
102,30 and the invention was ready for patenting as of the critical date.31
To determine if the pre-AIA patents were subject to a sale or offer for sale prior
to the critical date, the court applied the two-step framework32 from Pfaff .33
When addressing the first prong of Pfaff, the court used the analysis from
Medicines Co. v. Hospira, Inc.34 where the court reaffirmed the general proposition
that it will look to the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) to define a commercial
offer for sale,35 and “that ‘[a] sale is a contract between parties to give and to pass
rights of property for consideration which the buyer pays or promises to pay the
seller for the thing bought or sold.’”36
To determine “whether the transaction would be understood ‘in the
commercial community’ to constitute a commercial offer for sale” the court
considered three factors: confidentiality of the transaction, marketing of the
invention, and transfer of title. 37 The court then noted that while some of the
details were redacted in the publicly disclosed Supply and Purchase Agreement
between Helsinn and MGI, Helsinn did not argue the transaction itself remained
confidential.38 The court also found that Helsinn contracted MGI “‘to distribute,
promote, market, and sell’ the claimed invention,” Helsinn commercially marketed
the invention before the critical date, and the Supply and Purchase Agreement
expressly contemplated the transfer of title.39 The court rejected Helsinn’s
argument that there was no sale due to the uncertainty in the Supply and
Purchase Agreement regarding which dosage would be approved by the FDA,40
and held “there was a sale for purposes of pre-AIA § 102(b) prior to the critical

30.

Id. at 1371.
Id. at 1375.
32. See supra note 19.
33. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Pfaff v.
Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998)).
34. 827 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
35. Id. at 1365.
36. Id. at 1373 (quoting Trading Techs. Int’l v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
37. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing
Medicines Co. v. Hospira, Inc., 827 F.3d at 1375–76 (quoting Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d
1041, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2001))).
38. Helsinn, 855 F.3d at 1364.
39. Id. (quoting J.A. 2255).
40. Id. at 1365–66 (explaining that regulatory approval is just a type of conditional precedent which is a
basic feature of contract law, and stating “[t]his contract is indistinguishable from a situation involving two
otherwise identical contracts, one covering the 0.25 mg dose and the other covering the 0.75 mg dose, each
contingent on FDA approval.”).
31.
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date because there was a sale of the invention under the law of contracts as
generally understood.”41
Next, the Federal Circuit Court addressed whether the ‘219 patent was subject
to the on-sale bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102, similar to the pre-AIA patents, or if the
AIA changed the meaning of the on-sale bar.42 Teva argued that when Congress
chose to reenact the existing statutory term “on sale,” Congress did not change
the law of the on-sale bar.43 Helsinn argued that the AIA changed the law of the
on-sale bar by adding in the phrase “otherwise available to the public” to not
cover secret sales, but the additional language required that a sale make the
invention available to the public for the on-sale bar to apply.44 Helsinn’s argument
rested on the additional statutory language added to § 102 under the AIA and
floor comments made by individual members of Congress.45
The court concluded that the intent of the floor statements was “to do away
with precedent under current § 102 law,” 46 but the floor statements only refereed
to precluding extreme results from cases 47 where the “public use” prong of §
102(b) held certain secret uses to be invalidating.48 The court found the floor
statements did not reference any on sale cases that would be overturned by the
amendments, and even if the amendments intended to overrule secret sale cases,
it would not apply in this case. 49 In this case, the Supply and Purchase Agreement
between Helsinn and MGI was publicly announced in MGI’s 8-K filing with the SEC,
and it included “all the pertinent details of the transaction other than the price
and dosage levels.”50
The court concluded that if Congress intended to make the drastic change to
the on-sale bar jurisprudence that Helsinn suggested, the on-sale bar not applying
unless the sale “discloses the invention to the public” before the critical date, it
would do so by clear language.51 The court found:
A primary rationale of the on-sale bar is that publicly offering a product
for sale that embodies the claimed invention places it in the public
domain, regardless of when or whether actual delivery occurs. The
41.

Id. at 1364.
Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
43. Id. at 1368.
44. Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012)).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1368 (citing 157 Cong. Rec. 3415 (2011) (remarks of Sen. Leahy)).
47. See Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333 (1881); Beachcombers Int’l, v. Wildewood Creative Products,
Inc., 31 F.3d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1994); JumpSport, Inc. v. Jumpking, Inc., 191 F. App’x 926 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
48. Helsinn, 855 F.3d at 1368.
49. Id. at 1369.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1371.
42.
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patented product need not be on-hand or even delivered prior to the
critical date to trigger the on-sale bar. And, as previously noted, we
have never required that a sale be consummated or an offer accepted
for the invention to be in the public domain and the on-sale bar to
apply, nor have we distinguished sales from mere offers for sale. We
have also not required that members of the public be aware that the
product sold actually embodies the claimed invention. 52
The court held that the ‘219 patent was on sale under the AIA because “after
the AIA, if the existence of the sale is public,” like the Supply and Purchase
Agreement in this case due to MGI’s 8-K filing with the SEC, “the details of the
invention need not be publicly disclosed in terms of sale.”53
The last step in Pfaff’s two-step framework was for the court to determine if
the invention was ready for patenting prior to the critical date. 54 The court found
the second step of Pfaff was satisfied when it concluded “the invention here was
ready for patenting because it was reduced to practice before the critical date.” 55
Thus, the Federal Circuit found both the pre-AIA patents and the AIA patent to be
invalid under the on-sale bar.56
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to address if the AIA
changed the meaning of the on-sale bar to allow an invention to be considered
not on sale when it is subject to a commercial sale to a third party that is required
to keep the invention confidential.57
II.

L EGAL BACKGROUND

The United States Constitution grants Congress the enumerated power to
“promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writing and
discoveries.”58 To help achieve this goal, Congress created the federal patent law
system. Since the inception of the federal patent laws, Congress has tried to
achieve a “balance between the interest in motivating innovation and
enlightenment by rewarding invention with patent protection on the one hand,
and the interest in avoiding monopolies that unnecessarily stifle competition on

52.

Id. at 1370–71.
Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
54. Id.
55. Id. (While this is a step of the Pfaff v. Wells analysis, the Reduction to Practice aspect will not be
discussed in this case note.).
56. Id. at 1375.
57. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 630 (2019).
58. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
53.
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the other.”59 The on-sale bar has been a tool used by Congress to achieve this
balance since it was first codified in the Patent Act of 1836.60 Throughout the life
of the on-sale bar, it has evolved from an absolute bar to one that strives to create
certainty for inventors for when the filing of a patent should occur. 61
A. The On-Sale Bar Prior to the America Invents Act (Pre-AIA)
The on-sale bar was first codified in the Patent Act of 1836, where an absolute bar
existed for any invention that was subject to a sale that occurred with the
“consent or allowance of the inventor” prior to applying for a patent. 62 The Patent
Act of 1839 removed the requirement of consent or allowance from the inventor
and introduced a two-year grace period.63 Under the Patent Act of 1839, the twoyear grace period was measured “from the completion of [the] invention,” 64
allowing the inventor to sell the invention before applying for a patent.65 The
Court went on to state completion of an invention requires conception and
reduction to practice.66 The main purpose of this amendment “was ‘to fix a period
of limitation which should be certain’; it required the inventor to make sure that a
patent application was filed ‘within two years from the completion of his
invention.’”67
The on-sale bar remained unchanged for almost a century until the Patent Act
of 1939, where the grace period was reduced from two years to one year. 68
However, the Patent Act of 1939 retained the principle that the grace period is
measured from the completion of the invention.69
The on-sale bar under the Patent Act of 1952 was codified at Title 35, Section
102(b) of the United States Code.70 This version of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) stated “[a]
person shall be entitled to a patent unless the invention was patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on
sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of application for patent
in the United States.”71 When evaluating the on-sale bar, the Federal Circuit took
59.

Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998).
5 Stat. 117 (1836).
61. See Andrews v. Hovey, 123 U.S. 267, 274 (1887).
62. 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
63. 5 Stat. 353 (1839).
64. Hovey, 123 U.S. at 274.
65. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S, 55, 65 (1998).
66. See, e.g., Clark Thread Co. v. Willimantic Linen Co., 140 U.S. 481, 489 (1891); Corona Cord Tire Co. v.
Dovan Chemical Corp., 276 U.S. 358, 382–83 (1928).
67. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 65 (quoting Andrews v. Hovey, 123 U.S. 267, 274 (1887)).
68. 53 Stat. 1212 (1939).
69. Id.
70. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
71. Id.
60.
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the approach that “[a]ll the circumstances surrounding the sale or offer to sell,
including the stage of development of the invention and the nature of the
invention, must be considered and weighed against the policies underlying section
102(b).”72
When the Federal Circuit’s holistic view reached the Supreme Court in Pfaff,
the Court rejected the totality of circumstances approach when evaluating the onsale bar.73 The Court found that the totality of the circumstances approach
“seriously undermines the interest in certainty”74 because it made the “timeliness
of an application depend on the date when an invention is ‘substantially
complete.’”75 The Court concluded that for the on-sale bar to apply, two
conditions must be met: (1) the product must be the subject of a commercial offer
for sale and (2) the invention must be ready for patenting. 76
While the Court in Pfaff did not go in detail with respect to the first prong of
the two-part test it developed, it did analyze the second prong. 77 The Court found
the “word ‘invention’ must refer to a concept that is complete, rather than merely
one that is ‘substantially complete,’” and that proof of reduction is not necessary
in every case.78,79 The Court found the second condition could be satisfied “by
proof of reduction to practice before the critical date; or by proof that prior to the
critical date the invention had prepared drawings or other descriptions of the
invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to
practice the invention.”80
The Federal Circuit in Medicines Co. v. Hospira, Inc.81 analyzed the first prong
developed in Pfaff by defining what it meant for a patent to be subject to a
commercial sale or offer for sale.82 In coming to the definition of a commercial
sale, the court referenced prior cases to shed light on the matter. 83 In Group One
Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., the court stated there was “no binding precedent” in
the circuit that required the court to “accept something less than an offer to

72. UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 656 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great
Plains Chem. Co., 103 F.3d 1538, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Brigance, 792 F.2d 1103, 1107–08 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
73. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 65–67 (1998).
74. See supra text accompanying note 61.
75. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 65–66.
76. Id. at 67–68.
77. Meds. Co. v. Hospira, Inc., 827 F.3d 1363, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
78. See Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1, 535–36 (1888) (demonstrating that an invention is
complete and ready for patenting before it has actually been reduced to practice).
79. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 66 (1998).
80. Id. at 67–68.
81. 827 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
82. Id. at 1365.
83. Id. at 1373.

8

Journal of Business & Technology Law Proxy

CHRISTOPHER HOWES
contract as constituting an offer for sale as that term is construed for the purposes
of the on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).”84 The court in Medicines Co. v. Hospira
also referenced Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., where the court stated
“[t]he transaction at issue must be a ‘sale’ in a commercial law sense.” 85 The court
in Medicines held “a commercial sale is one that bears the general hallmarks of a
sale pursuant to Section 2-106 of the Uniform Commercial Code .”86, 87 The court
went on to state that even “when no actual sale is present, ‘[o]nly an offer which
rises to the level of a commercial offer for sale, one which the other party could
make into a binding contract by simple acceptance (assuming consideration)’
triggers the on-sale bar.”88 In addition, the Federal Circuit has rejected the idea
that a sale or offer for sale “kept secret from the trade” did not trigger the on-sale
bar.89 The Federal Circuit has concluded that “sales or offers by one person of a
claim invention … bar another party from obtaining a patent if the sale or offer to
sell is made over a year before the latter’s filing date.” 90
The two-part test for analyzing the on-sale bar under the Patent Act of 1952,
established in Pfaff v. Wells, is the governing rule for patents filed before March
16, 2013. Analyzing the on-sale bar for patents filed on or after March 16, 2013
must be done under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.
B. The On-Sale Bar Under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA)
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act modified the language of 35 U.S.C. § 102, as
well as the entire patent filing system of the United States. 91 Under the AIA, the
United States moved from a first-to-invent system to a first-inventor-to-file
system.92 The United States did not adopt a pure first-inventor-to-file system, as it
retained a one-year grace period in certain instances.93
Under the AIA, the statute that now contains the on-sale bar, § 102(a), states
“[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless the claimed invention was

84.

254 F.3d 1041, 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
595 F.3d 1340, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336,
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
86. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) (“A ‘sale’ consists in the passing of title
from the seller to the buyer for a price (Section 2-401).”); see also In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 676 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (“It is well settled that a sale is a contract between parties to give and to pass rights of property for
consideration which the buyer pays or promises to pay the seller for the thing bought or sold.”).
87. 827 F.3d at 1365.
88. Id. at 1378 (quoting Group One Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
89. In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
90. Id. at 675.
91. 157 Cong. Rec. 1362 (2011) (remarks of Sen. Leahy).
92. Id.
93. 157 Cong. Rec. 1366 (2011) (remarks of Sen. Kyl).
85.
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patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise
available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.” 94
III.

T HE COURT ’S R EASONING

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Thomas held that “an inventor’s sale of an
invention to a third party who is obligated to keep the invention confidential can
qualify as prior art under § 102(a)” because Congress did not alter the meaning of
the on-sale bar when it enacted the AIA.95 During its analysis, the Court
considered the history of Congress’ pursuit in promoting “the Progress of Science
and useful Arts,”96 the statutory interpretation of 35 U.S.C § 102(a)(1), and the
Federal Circuit’s determination that Helsinn’s AIA patent would have been
considered on sale under the on sale pre-AIA precedent.97
When considering Congress’ approach to creating a federal patent system, the
Court noted that “Congress has imposed several limiting conditions on the ‘limited
opportunity to obtain a property right in an idea,’”98 in its “goal of ‘motivating
innovation and enlightenment’ while also ‘avoiding monopolies that unnecessarily
stifle competition.’”99 The Court identified the on-sale bar as one of those limiting
conditions, and stated that since 1836, the on-sale bar has reflected “Congress’
‘reluctance to allow an inventor to remove existing knowledge from public use’ by
obtaining a patent covering that knowledge.”100
Next the Court considered the statutory interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)
under the AIA.101 The Court found that by reenacting the language “on sale” in the
AIA, Congress intended to bring the judicial construction of that phrase into the
AIA.102 The Court found that Congress simply adding the catchall phrase
“otherwise available to the public” was not enough for the Court to determine
Congress intended to alter the meaning of the reenacted language of “on sale.” 103
The Court decided the phrase “otherwise available to the public” was added to
capture materials that do “not fit neatly into the statute’s enumerated categories
but are nevertheless meant to be covered.”104

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

10

35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012).
Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 634 (2019).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Helsinn, 139 S. Ct. at 633–34.
Id. at 632 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989)).
Id. at 632 (citing Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998)).
Id. (citing Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 64).
Id.
Id.
Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 634 (2019).
Id.
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Finally, the Court visited the fact that Helsinn did not dispute “the Federal
Circuit’s determination that the invention claimed in the ‘219 patent was ‘on sale’
within the meaning of the pre-AIA statute.”105 Because Helsinn did not dispute this
determination by the Federal Circuit, and the Court found Congress did not
change the meaning of the on-sale bar under the AIA, the Court determined that
the invention claimed in the ‘219 patent qualified as prior art under § 102(a). 106
Using this analysis, the Court held “that an inventor’s sale of an invention to a
third party who is obligated to keep the invention confidential can qualify as prior
art under § 102(a),” and affirmed the Federal Circuit’s judgment that the invention
claimed in the ‘219 patent was subject to the on-sale bar under the AIA.107
IV.

ANALYSIS

In Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., the Supreme Court held “an
inventor’s sale of an invention to a third party who is obligated to keep the
invention confidential can qualify as prior art under § 102(a),” and affirmed the
Federal Circuit’s judgment that the invention claimed in the ‘219 patent was
invalid under the on-sale bar of the AIA.108 The Court’s holding was correct
because Congress did not clearly express its intent to change the years of pre-AIA
precedent, Helsinn and MGI’s transaction was not secret and placed the invention
on sale as defined by its claims, and it furthers the promotion of the progress of
science and useful arts.
A. The Court’s Holding is Correct Because Congress did not Clearly Express
its Intent to Change the Years of Pre-AIA Precedent
Under the Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) stated “[a] person shall be
entitled to a patent unless the invention was patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country,
more than one year prior to the date of application for patent in the United
States.”109 Under the AIA, the statute that contains the on-sale bar now states “[a]
person shall be entitled to a patent unless the claimed invention was patented,
described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available
to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.” 110 In this
case, the Court held that Congress did not alter the meaning of the on-sale bar
when it enacted the AIA.111 The Court’s holding is correct because the floor
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statements did not reflect a desire to change the on-sale bar and Congress chose
to reenact the terms “on sale” which have developed a specific judicial
interpretation.
Helsinn argued that Congress intended to change the meaning of the on-sale
bar based on the addition of the phrase “otherwise available to the public” and
extrinsic materials, such as floor statements made by individual members of
Congress.112 While “[e]xtrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation
. . . . Not all extrinsic materials are reliable sources of insight into legislative
understandings . . . .”113 As the Court has “repeatedly held, the authoritative
statement is the statutory text, not . . . any other extrinsic material.”114 It has been
long settled that when Congress chooses to reenact language, “[t]he words,
having received such a construction under” the previous statute, “must be given
the same meaning when used” in the new statute “on the theory, that, in using
the phrase in the later statute, Congress adopted the construction already given
to it by this court.”115 Therefore, the Court was correct to hold Congress did not
change the meaning of the on-sale bar when Congress chose to reenact the welldeveloped term of “on sale.”
B. The Court’s Holding is Correct Because the Transaction Itself was not
Private and Helsinn and MGI’s Agreements Placed the Invention On Sale
as Defined by the Patent Claims
In their argument, Helsinn relied on floor statements made by individual members
of Congress, extrinsic materials,116 about the on-sale bar.117 Many of the floor
statements considering an alteration to the meaning of the on-sale bar included
administrative concerns of monitoring secret sales.118
When addressing the relationship between secret sales and the AIA on-sale
bar, Senator Kyl stated:
A contrary construction of section 102(a)(1), which allowed private and
non-disclosing . . . sales to constitute invalidating prior art, would be
112.
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fairly disastrous for the U.S. patent system. First, the bill’s new postgrant review, in which any validity challenge can be raised, would be
utterly unmanageable if the validity of all patents subject to review
under the new system continued to depend on discovery-intensive
searches for secret offers for sale . . . by third parties.119
In continuing on the topic of administrative concerns for monitoring secret
sales under the on-sale bar, Senator Kyl went on to state that:
A sale . . . that discloses an invention to the public is relatively hard to
falsify. If the invention truly was made available to the public by sale
. . . independent validation of that sale . . . should be readily available.
By contrast, the existence of a secret offer for sale . . . largely will turn
on the affidavits or statements of the parties to such an occurrence. 120
The scenarios seemingly focused on in the floor statements relate to the
situation where the sale of an invention is so secret that the only evidence of the
sale would be internal to the two companies. This type of secret sale would likely
occur where two companies are so related, have such a familiar business
relationship, or are so intertwined in dealings that it would be impossible for
outsiders to know of the existence of this sale.
In contrast, Helsinn and MGI engaged in an arm’s length transaction. It can
hardly be said that Helsinn and MGI engaged in a secret sale where they publicly
announced their agreements in a joint press release and filed partially redacted
copies of the agreements in MGI’s Form 8-K filing with the SEC.121 Therefore, even
if the Court gave these statements that were focused on “secret sales” more
weight in determining the meaning of the on-sale bar under the AIA, the
transaction itself between Helsinn and MGI was not a private agreement, and
thus, the administrative concerns of the floor statements would not apply in this
case.
To specifically address some of Senator Kyl’s concerns, discovering the
existence of these agreements would not involve a “discovery-intensive search,”
and the sale could easily be independently validated. Further, it was not only the
knowledge of the sale that was available to the public, but detailed information
about palonosetron was available as well. 122 The agreements included the benefits
and uses of palonosetron in treating CINV, the chemical structure of palonosetron,
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and described the products as: “pharmaceutical preparations for human use in
[intravenous] dosage form, containing [palonosetron] as an active ingredient.” 123
An invention may only be on sale if it is the invention as defined by the patent’s
claims.124 In this case, the invention was placed on sale as defined by its claims, 125
due to the inclusion of the benefits and uses, the chemical structure, and the
description of the invention in the agreements.126 Therefore, not only was the
transaction itself not private, but the invention that was on sale under the
transaction, defined by the patent’s claims, was not private. 127 Thus, the Court’s
holding that the ‘219 patent was invalid under the AIA on-sale bar was correct
because even if the Court considered the floor statements more heavily in
determining the meaning of the on-sale bar under the AIA, it would be unlikely for
this sale to be deemed of the kind, “private and non-disclosing,”128 that
congressional floor statements had administrative concerns over.
C. The Court’s Holding is Correct Because it Furthers the Promotion of the
Progress of Science and Useful Arts
The United States Constitution grants Congress the enumerated power to
“promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writing and
discoveries.”129 In pursuing this goal, Congress created the federal patent system
that “represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and
the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an
exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time.” 130 “Moreover, the ultimate goal
123.
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of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public
domain through disclosure.”131
Patent laws are structured to “protect the public’s right to retain knowledge
already in the public domain and the inventor’s right to control whether and when
he may patent his invention.”132 The on-sale bar in particular is “primarily
concerned with the policy that encourages an inventor to enter the patent system
promptly,”133 and strives to create a degree of certainty for when the inventor
must file for a patent to receive the benefit of the monopoly. 134 With patent law
striving to prevent knowledge being taken from the public domain and the on-sale
bar focusing on encouraging inventors to promptly enter the patent system, which
leads to more knowledge in the public domain, it is no surprise that the on-sale
bar has a history of applying no matter who put the invention in the public
domain.135 Courts have stated the on-sale bar would be triggered even when the
invention is put on sale by an innocent third party, fraudulent third party, or even
if a thief stole the invention, passed it on to an innocent buyer and that innocent
buyer offered to the sell the invention.136
In this case, the Court held that Congress did not alter the meaning of the onsale bar when it enacted the AIA, thus “an inventor’s sale of an invention to a third
party who is obligated to keep the invention confidential can qualify as prior art
under § 102(a).”137 This holding furthers the progress of science and useful arts
because it does not allow for knowledge to be taken from the public domain by an
inventor. Under the facts of the case, nearly two years before applying for a
patent, the Supply and Purchase Agreement between Helsinn and MGI was
included in MGI’s 8-K filing with the SEC, as well as a partially redacted copy of the
contract for sale (excluding the dosage level and the price). 138 The public filings
included “[d]etailed information about palonosetron, its benefits and uses in
treating CINV,” and the chemical structure of palonosetron.139 This is a similar
situation to the one the Court faced in Pennock v. Dialogue where the Court
addressed a public sale that withheld “the secrets of the invention.”140 The Court
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in that case explained that it “would materially retard the progress of science and
the useful arts, and give a premium to those who should be least prompt to
communicate their discoveries.”141
V.

CONCLUSION

In Helsinn Healthcare v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., the Supreme Court of the United
States addressed whether the AIA changed the meaning of the on-sale bar to
allow an invention to not be considered on sale when it is subject to a commercial
sale to a third party that is required to keep the invention confidential. 142 The
Court held “an inventor’s sale of an invention to a third party who is obligated to
keep the invention confidential can qualify as prior art under § 102(a),” and
affirmed the Federal Circuit’s judgment that the invention claimed in the ‘219
patent was subject to the on-sale bar.143 The Court’s holding was correct because
Congress did not clearly express its intent to change the years of pre-AIA
precedent,144 Helsinn and MGI’s transaction was not secret and placed the
invention on sale as defined by its claims,145 and the holding furthers the
promotion of the progress of science and useful arts.146
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